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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
t

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

i

GEORGE WAREHAM,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 890401

Category No. 2

:

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE
INTRODUCTION
This supplemental brief is submitted pursuant to the
Court's order that the parties provide additional argument and
authority regarding the issue of whether defendant has waived the
right to challenge his sentence in the instant appeal because the
claim of error could and should have been raised in his first
appeal to this Court.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED THE RIGHT TO unaLLENGE
HIS SENTENCE IN THE INSTANT APPEAL BECAUSE
THE CLAIM OF ERROR COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN
RAISED IN HIS FIRST APPEAL TO THIS COURT.
In response to defendant's argument that the statute
under which he was convicted and sentenced violates the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, the State,
in a brief already filed with the Court, observed that

,f

[i]t is

not clear that defendant is in a position to raise this issue in
a second appeal from the same conviction and sentence that he had

a full opportunity to attack in his first appeal, which was
decided in State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 (Utah 1989)."

Br. of

Appellee at 3 (citing Fernandez v. Cook, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 13,
14 n.3 (Utah Nov. 16, 1989)).

Upon further consideration of

footnote 3 of Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989), and
authority from other jurisdictions, the State believes that
defendant is clearly precluded from raising the ex post facto
issue in this second appeal.
In Fernandez, the Court stated:
Both the State and the district court
apparently assumed that Fernandez could and
should have raised the arguments now made in
his habeas corpus petition in the pro se
appeal that he filed after resentencing.
This assumption is erroneous. The only
direct appeal in which the ineffective
assistance of counsel and biased jury claims
could have properly been raised was the
appeal taken immediately after Fernandez's
conviction — the appeal handled by trial
counsel. The only issues that could have
properly been raised in the appeal from the
resentencing were those related solely to to
the new sentence. Therefore, Fernandez's new
counsel properly dismissed the second appeal
in order to raise the ineffective assistance
claim via habeas corpus.
783 P.2d at 550 n.3 (citation omitted).

This passage makes clear

that a defendant must raise all assignments of error relating to
the judgment of conviction in a first direct appeal; subsequent
appeals involving the same judgment of conviction are necessarily
limited to new issues that may arise after the first appeal has
been decided.

This waiver rule is consistent with that followed

in numerous jurisdictions.

See, e.g., Bell v. New York Higher

Education Assistance Corp., 550 N.Y.S.2d 712, 713 (A.D. 1990)
("Any complaint, with respect to whether that order had, in fact,
-2-

been entered was waived by reason of plaintiff's failure to raise
such an argument on his prior appeals."); Tainalunis v. City of
Georgetown, 185 111.App.3d 173, 134 111.Dec. 223, 542 N.E.2d 402,
412 (111. App. 1989) (liability issue waived for purposes of
second appeal because it was not raised in first appeal), appeal
denied, 128 111.2d 672, 139 111.Dec. 523, 548 N.E.2d 1079 (111.
1989); Oregon Education Association v. Eugene School Dist. No.
4J, 60 Or.App. 326, 653 P.2d 1000 (1982) (party did not assign
error in earlier appeal, although it could have done so, and
therefore issue could not be raised for first time in subsequent
appeal); People v. Jackson, 110 Cal.Rptr. 1^2, 514 P.2d 1222,
1224 (1973) (in absence of any justificatiori by defendant for 11year delay in attacking judgment of guilt on ground of
ineffective assistance of counsel although defendant had been
before supreme court on three separate occasions since
conviction, supreme court would not consider the argument on
appeal from death penalty imposed in third retrial of penalty
issue).
In People v. Malacara, 199 Colo. 243, 606 P.2d 1300
(1980), the Colorado Supreme Court refused to review the
I
propriety of the defendant's sentence in a second appeal under
circumstances very similar to those in the jLnstant case. There,
the defendant was convicted of and sentenced for conspiracy to
sell and possession of narcotic drugs with the intent to sell.
The defendant appealed his convictions on the ground that the
trial court erroneously restricted cross-examination of a
prosecution witness; he did not request review of his sentence.

The appellate court affirmed his convictions.

Following the

affirmance, the defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence
pursuant to rule 35(a), Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure,

on

the grounds of good behavior and efforts to rehabilitate himself
during the pendency of the appeal. After a full evidentiary
hearing, the trial court determined that the original sentence
should stand and denied the motion.
that ruling.

The defendant appealed from

The Colorado Supreme Court dismissed the appeal,

holding that "[a] defendant is only entitled to appellate review
of the propriety of his sentence once[,] . . . [and] [t]hat
challenge can only be raised on appeal of his judgment of
conviction . . . .•• 606 P.2d at 1303.

This same analysis should

be applied in the instant case, where defendant seeks review of
the trial court's denial of his motion for reduction of sentence.
Although defendant did not cite rule 22(e), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as authority for his motion, that rule, which
is similar to Colorado's rule 35(a) discussed in Malacara,
appears to be the only rule under which defendant could have
properly brought his motion.

Thus, the Malacara analysis is

particularly pertinent.
Not allowing defendant to raise the sentencing issue in
a second appeal is also consistent with waiver rules followed by
this Court in similar contexts.

For example, in State v.

Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990), the Court declined to

As noted in Malacara, a rule 35(a) motion allows a trial court,
inter alia, to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed
in an illegal manner. This is precisely what rule 22(e), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, allows a trial court to do.
-4-

reach the defendant's constitutional challenge to a statute under
the well settled rule that issues raised for the first time on
2
appeal will not be reviewed.

And, in the habeas corpus context,

this Court has repeatedly stated that, abserit unusual
circumstances or good cause, issues that could and should have
been raised in earlier proceedings (including direct appeals)
will not be reviewed.

See, e.g., Andrews v. Shulsen, 773 P.2d

832 (Utah 1988) (because the petitioner failed to establish good
cause for review of claims that could have been, but were not,
raised on direct appeal or in previous habeas corpus petitions,
his claims would not be reviewed); Robbins v. Cook, 737 P.2d 225
(Utah 1987) (absent unusual circumstances, a habeas petitioner
cannot raise issues which could or should have been brought on
direct appeal).

See also Dunn v. Cook, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 13

(Utah Apr.2, 1990) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result)
(discussing procedural default rule).
Based on the foregoing discussion, this Court should
not reach defendant's ex post facto claim because he could and
should have raised the issue in his first appeal and has offered
nothing to establish good cause for not having raised it in the
prior appeal. Significantly, defendant's current counsel was
2
It is significant that in the instant case defendant, had he
sought review of the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5404.1(3)(g) (Interim Supp. 1984) on his first appeal, would have
been subject to the waiver rule applied in Anderson because, at
that point, the issue had not been presented to the trial court.
Defendant did not raise the ex post facto claim in the lower
court until after his first appeal had been decided. His motion
for reduction of sentence, the denial of which gives rise to the
instant appeal, was little more than an attempt to avoid the
waiver rule applied in Anderson and numerous other decisions of
this Court.

also counsel at trial and on the first appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing argument, the Court should
dismiss defendant's appeal on the ground that the issue he raises
should have been raised in his first direct appeal to this Court.
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